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Guarding the Guardians:
Should Guardians ad Litem Be Immune from
Liability for Negligence?
Alberto Bernabe*
Illinois has a very comprehensive regulatory system for guardianships,
which are recognized and regulated by several different statutes including
the Illinois Probate Act and the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of
Marriage Act. Unfortunately, notwithstanding this comprehensive
regulation, courts have struggled with the question of whether guardians ad
litem should be immune from possible liability for injuries caused to their
wards. Under the Marriage Act, an attorney appointed as a guardian ad
litem is expected to perform duties on behalf of the court while the language
of the Probate Act suggests that a guardian ad litem is appointed to represent
the minor as an advocate. This distinction could result in holding that a
guardian ad litem appointed under the Marriage Act could be immune from
liability, while one appointed under the Probate Act could be subject to
liability. Also, given that judges have inherent authority to appoint guardians
ad litem without reference to any specific statute, whether the appointed
guardian could be subject to possible liability for negligence could also
depend on an analysis of the actual duties assigned to the guardian. Adding
to the confusion, in a case called Nichols v. Fahrenkamp the Illinois Supreme
Court recently made the analysis more difficult to understand. This Article
explores the issue of whether guardians ad litem should be subject to liability
and whether the Illinois Supreme Court reached the correct result in
Nichols. The Article concludes that although the facts before the court did
not quite support the court’s conclusion, the court made some good
suggestions that can help clarify this area of the law in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Illinois has a very comprehensive and, at least according to some,
“progressive,” regulatory system for guardianships.1 According to
Illinois law, a “guardian” is defined as a person, institution, or agency
appointed by a court to manage the affairs of another person, who can be
a minor or an adult with a disability due to a mental illness, physical
incapacity, or developmental disability, who is referred to as their
“ward.”2 The Illinois Probate Act (the Probate Act) recognizes no less
than seven different types of guardianships.3 In addition, according to the
Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Marriage Act), in
any proceedings involving the support, custody, visitation, allocation of
parental responsibilities, or general welfare of a minor or dependent child,
the court may appoint an attorney to serve as a guardian ad litem or as a
child representative.4 Finally, the Illinois Juvenile Court Act (the Juvenile
Act) provides that a court may appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor
during a juvenile delinquency proceeding if the court finds that there may
be a conflict of interest between the minor and his or her parent, guardian,
or legal custodian or that it is otherwise in the minor’s interest to do so.5
Unfortunately, for the same reason that the Illinois list of guardianships
is so comprehensive, and although the Probate Act establishes a
comprehensive framework for guardianship, some areas of guardianship
1. Vincent Machroli, What Types of Guardianships Are Available in Illinois?, ILL. LAW. NOW
(June 13, 2019), https://www.illinoislawyernow.com/2019/06/what-types-of-guardianships-areavailable-in-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/Z5QW-5ZJB]. See also George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Role
Duality and the Issue of Immunity for the Guardian ad Litem in the District of Columbia, 4 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 279, 280 (2002) (noting that guardianship policy has its origins in ancient Greece and
Rome, but the approach to it taken by courts in the United States is based on the English Common
Law and the doctrine of parens patriae, which was appropriated by the colonies and applied to both
minors and those incapable of caring for themselves in the form of court appointed guardians).
2. Illinois Probate Act , 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-2.08, 1-2.14 (2020); Illinois Marriage and
Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506 (2020). See also MARY L. MILANO ET
AL., A GUIDE TO ADULT GUARDIANSHIP IN ILLINOIS 1 (June 2011) [hereinafter GUIDE TO
GUARDIANSHIP],
available
at
https://www.illinois.gov/sites/gac/OSG/Documents/
GuideAdultGuardianship2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/3MRE-T8CF] (“A guardian may also be
appointed if, because of ‘gambling, idleness, debauchery, or excessive use of intoxicants or drugs,’
a person spends or wastes his/her estate so as to expose himself/herself or his/her family to want or
suffering. In either case, guardianship may be necessary to protect the person and to promote the
interests of others, such as service providers or creditors.”).
3. Illinois Probate Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1–11 (2020).
4. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506(a) (2020).
5. Illinois Juvenile Court Act, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-610(1) (2020).
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law and practice in Illinois are still confusing.6 In fact, it has been
reported that, although the only way someone can be appointed as
guardian for another person in Illinois is to be appointed by the circuit
court,7 many Illinois probate judges interpret legal principles or
procedures differently, and sometimes do not apply them at all.8 Each
county circuit court may also have its own practices or rules.
Consequently, certain procedures that may be taken for granted in a
particular county may not be used in another, such as the appointment of
a guardian ad litem during guardianship procedures, which the statute
anticipates will be done in all cases, but which is a component of the
process that is often waived by some probate courts.9
In addition, one area of the law that has proven to be confusing is the
issue of whether guardians ad litem should be immune from possible
liability for injuries caused to their wards when performing their duties
as guardians. Historically, courts sometimes rely upon guardians ad litem
to provide objective determinations as to the best interests of a minor or
of a person with a disability, unbiased by the interests of the respective
parties involved. In so doing, guardians ad litem have to make decisions,
the outcomes of which have significant repercussions for the parties
6. One area of confusion that has been eliminated is the possible conflict of interest in
appointing a lawyer to represent a minor at the same time that he or she is appointed to be a guardian
ad litem in a juvenile delinquency proceeding. The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated this
widespread practice in 2012, holding that representing a minor as an attorney and as a guardian at
the same time constitutes an inherent conflict of interest and creates too much of a risk of a violation
of a minor’s constitutional right to counsel. People v. Austin M., 975 N.E.2d 22, 42 (Ill. 2012). See
generally Alberto Bernabe, A Good Step in the Right Direction: Illinois Eliminates the Conflict
Between Attorneys and Guardians, 38 J. LEGAL PROF. 161 (2013) [hereinafter A Good Step in the
Right Direction]; Alberto Bernabe, The Right to Counsel Denied: Confusing the Roles of Lawyers
and Guardians, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 833 (2012) [hereinafter The Right to Counsel Denied].
7. The procedures for obtaining a court-appointed guardian are set forth in the Illinois Probate
Act, 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5 (2020).
8. As a result of this incongruity between the statutory regimes under the Marriage Act and the
Probate Act, in recent years Illinois courts have appointed guardians ad litem to report on children’s
best interests, as described by the Marriage Act, even in proceedings under article XI of the Probate
Act. See MARY L. MILANO ET AL., A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO ADULT GUARDIANSHIP IN
ILLINOIS 1 (2007) [hereinafter PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP], available at
https://www2.illinois.gov/sites/gac/OSG/Documents/PRAGUIDE2007.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
GYQ7-LFB5]; see also Nichols v. Fahrenkamp, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 32–34 (discussing certain courts
that provide descriptions of guardians ad litem consistent with the Marriage Act, while noting that
others fail to provide descriptions at all).
9. Compare GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 4 (“Although the process described in
the Illinois Probate Act anticipates the appointment of guardians ad litem in all cases, many probate
courts will waive this requirement for cause.”), with PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP,
supra note 8, at 11–12 (“In Cook County, protocol requires the appointment of a guardian ad litem
in all estate guardianships, and in person guardianships which might result in a physical intrusion
(surgery or forced medication) or a denial of rights (involuntary placement or objection to
guardianship by the respondent). Most downstate courts require the appointment of guardians ad
litem in all cases except temporary guardianships . . . regardless of whether estate guardianship is
at issue.”).
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involved. Accordingly, it has been argued that guardians ad litem should
be allowed to have immunity from liability in order to make such
important decisions without the fear that their judgment will be second
guessed through the use of personal liability claims that could force them
to engage in expensive, stressful, and time consuming litigation.
This is an important issue because, by definition, guardians operate
under circumstances in which the wards depend on them to make
important decisions that often have long term, even life changing, effects.
Also, guardians are often in charge of their ward’s financial affairs, which
puts the guardians in a position to manage—or mismanage—the ward’s
money. Plenary guardianship is even more extreme, having the potential
to deprive a ward of participation in meaningful decisions that affect the
ward’s life.10 Thus, given the potential for improper conduct by
guardians, there is often a threat of litigation which leads to the question
of whether those affected by the conduct should be allowed to support a
claim to recover for the injuries suffered. In other words, is the type of
injury suffered by a ward as a result of the negligence of a guardian an
injury for which the law should recognize a remedy?
In a recent opinion, the Illinois Supreme Court tried to settle this issue
and seemed to agree with the argument that guardians ad litem should be
granted immunity and, therefore, should be protected from possible
liability.11 However, even though the court expressed a principle of law
that is (or should be considered to be) correct in the abstract, it is not clear
the analysis was entirely applicable to the facts of the case. For that
reason, it is not clear whether the result was justified, and the decision
may create some confusion as to its application in the future.
In order to further the discussion and to attempt to clarify the remaining
confusion, this Article will explore the issue of whether guardians ad
litem should be subject to liability for injuries caused to those whose
interests they are supposed to advance and whether the Illinois Supreme
Court reached the correct result in addressing it. The Article concludes
that although the facts before the court did not quite support its
conclusion, the court made some important suggestions that will go a long
way to help clarify this area of the law in the future. As a result, the
General Assembly should consider reviewing the Probate Act and the
Marriage Act to ensure that the phrase “guardian ad litem” is used
consistently throughout the statutes and courts should try to avoid
misunderstandings by specifying the statutory basis for an appointment

10. Edward Spurgeon & Mary Jane Ciccarello, Lawyers Acting as Guardians: Policy and
Ethical Considerations, 31 STETSON L. REV. 791, 791–92 (2002).
11. See Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 49 (“Therefore, we hold that guardians ad litem who submit
recommendations to the court on a child’s best interests are protected by quasi-judicial immunity.”).
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of a guardian and the specific tasks assigned to anyone appointed to serve
as a guardian ad litem.
I. GUARDIANSHIP AND GUARDIANS
As explained by the director of the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy
Commission, “[g]uardianship is an extreme form of intervention in the
life of a person, because control over personal and/or financial decisions
is transferred to someone else for an indefinite, often permanent,
period.”12 Thus, guardianships are meant to be utilized only if clearly
necessary to promote the wellbeing of the person subject to the
guardianship.13
The Probate Act recognizes and regulates several different types of
guardianships, but, interestingly, it does not provide a definition for the
concept of a guardian ad litem. Guardians ad litem are more prominently
mentioned in the Marriage Act14 and the Juvenile Act.15 Understanding
the distinctions between all these forms of guardianship and the context
in which they can operate is important before considering whether the
approach to immunity for guardians recently adopted by the Illinois
Supreme Court is valid.
Without more, a person’s age, or a mental, physical, or developmental
disability does not automatically dictate a need for guardianship.
Guardianship is needed only if a person is unable to make and
communicate responsible decisions regarding his or her personal care or
finances. Making incorrect or ill-advised decisions every once in a while
is not enough; what is relevant is the ability to make decisions to begin
with.16
Before 1979, people in need of possible guardianship were referred to
in Illinois as “incompetent” and the probate courts could appoint
“conservators” to care for their estate and finances.17 In 1979, the Illinois
Probate Act was amended to provide statutory protection for disabled
persons by establishing new forms of guardianship and new procedures

12. GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 8.
13. See id. (“The law requires that guardianship be used only if it will promote the well-being
of the person with disabilities and protect the person with disabilities against neglect, exploitation
and abuse, and encourages development of maximum self-reliance and independence.”).
14. See generally 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/101–802 (2020).
15. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-17 (2020).
16. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-3 (2020) (allowing courts to appoint a guardian to those
with disabilities upon a demonstration by clear and convincing evidence “that because of his
disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning the care of his person”).
17. PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8, at 2.
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for the appointment of guardians and for the supervision of disabled
persons and their estates.18
The Probate Act recognizes two general categories of guardianships
based on the specific duties the guardian is asked to perform: personal
guardians and guardians of the estate. When a person’s mental or physical
limitations require a guardian to decide on everything regarding that
person’s personal care, as well as their financial affairs, the court can
appoint a plenary guardian, who would have the authority to make
decisions for the ward regarding all matters.19 More commonly, however,
guardians are appointed as either guardians of the person or guardians of
the estate. Both of these types of guardians can be appointed for adults
with disabilities, or for minors, and can also be appointed as temporary
guardians,20 limited guardians,21 stand-by guardians,22 short-term

18. See generally 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1–30-3 (2020).
19. See id. § 11a-3 (granting courts authority to appoint guardians to persons with a disability).
20. Temporary guardianship is used in emergency situations to make sure that the person in
need of a guardianship is protected. id. § 11a-4(a). The court may appoint a temporary guardian
prior to the appointment of a guardian, during an appeal in relation to the appointment, or upon a
guardian’s death, incapacity, or resignation. Id. This type of guardianship can only last a maximum
of sixty days. Id. § 11a-4(b). For a description of all the different types of guardianships recognized
by the Illinois Probate Act, see PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8, at 1–3
and GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 12–15.
21. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-14 (2020) (defining the boundaries of limited
guardianship). Courts appoint a limited guardian when the ward can make limited decisions about
his or her personal care or finances. GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 12–13. In such
cases, the court must list the exact limits of authority the guardian will have to make decisions for
the ward. Id. Outside of those limits, the ward would be allowed to make his or her own decisions.
Id.
22. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-3.1 (2020) (“Appointment of standby guardian.”); see also
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that standby guardianship is
used to provide continuity in the guardianship case if the primary guardian dies, becomes
incapacitated or is no longer acting); GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 14 (explaining that
the standby guardian has the authority to act as guardian without direction of court for a period of
up to sixty days).
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guardians,23 successor guardians24 or testamentary guardians,25 all of
which are terms that refer to guardianships with limits in terms of time of
service or of the tasks imposed by the court.
A guardian of the person is appointed when a person with a disability
lacks enough understanding or ability to comprehend and express
appropriate decisions concerning his or her personal care.26 Similarly, if
the person is not disabled but is a minor, the court can appoint a “guardian
of a minor.”27 Guardians for a person, whether the person is an adult with
disabilities or a minor, are authorized to make decisions to provide for
the support, care, comfort, medical treatment, health, residential
placement, social services, education, and maintenance of the ward.28
Ideally, the guardian should assist the ward in the development of
maximum self-reliance and independence and, for that reason, all
decisions made by a guardian on behalf of a ward are supposed to be
made by conforming as closely as possible to what the ward, if
competent, would have done under the circumstances.29
23. Short-term guardianship is used to enable a guardian to appoint an acting guardian to take
over the guardian’s duties, without court approval, for short periods of time. See GUIDE TO
GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 14–15; PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8,
at 8. The duration of the appointment cannot “exceed a cumulative total of 60 days in any 12 month
period . . . .” 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-18.3(a) (2020). “[A] short-term guardian shall have the
authority to act as a guardian” of the person of a ward, “but shall not have any authority to act as
guardian of the estate of” the ward, other than to apply for and receive benefits to which the ward
may be entitled under federal, state, or local organizations or programs. Id. § 11a-18.3(b).
24. A successor guardian might be named in instances where guardianship is still necessary
after the originally-appointed guardian dies, becomes disabled, or resigns. See 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/11a-15 (2020) (“Upon the death, incapacity, resignation or removal of a guardian of the
estate or person of a living ward, the court shall appoint a successor guardian or terminate the
adjudication of disability. The powers and duties of the successor guardian shall be the same as
those of the predecessor guardian unless otherwise modified.”); see also GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP,
supra note 2, at 13–14 (detailing same).
25. A testamentary guardianship is appointed when the parent of a disabled person creates a
will that names a specific person who they would like to take on guardianship of the disabled person
after the parent’s death. GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 14. As with all other
guardianships, though, the designated person has to be approved by the court before he or she can
be officially appointed as guardian, and the court can appoint another person if they so choose. Id.;
see also 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-16 (2020) (explaining testamentary guardianship).
26. GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 13; see also 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-3
(2020) (“If the court adjudges a person to be a person with a disability, the court may appoint (1) a
guardian of his person, if it has been demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that because
of his disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate responsible
decisions concerning the care of his person . . . .”).
27. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-13 (2020) (explaining the duties of a guardian of a minor).
28. See id. § 11a-17 (outlining the duties of a personal guardian).
29. The statute specifically states that in order to make decisions, “the guardian shall determine
how the ward would have made a decision based on the ward’s previously expressed preferences,
and make decisions in accordance with the preferences of the ward.” Id. § 11a-17(e). In order to do
this, the statute suggests that the guardian should take into account “the ward’s personal,
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In contrast, when a person is unable to make or communicate
responsible decisions regarding the management of his or her finances,
the court can appoint a “guardian of the estate.”30 Subject to court
supervision, the guardian of the estate will make decisions about the
ward’s funds and the safeguarding of the ward’s income or other assets.
In doing so, the guardian of the estate can exercise all powers over the
estate and business affairs of the ward that the ward could exercise were
it not for the need for the guardianship.31 For example, the guardian may
make disbursements of the ward’s funds to the ward or others, may
perform contracts on behalf of the ward and, unless another person is
appointed to do so, may appear for the ward in legal proceedings.
Additionally, the Probate Act gives the court the flexibility to tailor
guardianship to meet the specific needs and capabilities of disabled
persons. For this reason, depending on the circumstances—most
importantly the needs and decision-making capacity of the disabled
person—the guardianship can be limited to specific tasks, matters, or a
specific period of time.32
The requirements for someone to qualify to be a guardian are minimal.
Any legal resident of the United States who is older than eighteen, who
has not been convicted of a serious crime, and who is of sound mind can
serve as guardian.33 Public and private not-for-profit agencies, other than
agencies that provide residential services to disabled persons residing in
their facilities, are also eligible to be guardians.34 If there is no other

philosophical, religious and moral beliefs, and ethical values relative to the decision to be made by
the guardian.” Id. “If the ward’s wishes are unknown and remain unknown after reasonable efforts
to discern them, the decision shall be made on the basis of the ward’s best interests as determined
by the guardian.” Id.
30. Id. § 11a-18(a); see also id. § 11-13(b) (“The guardian or other representative of the ward’s
estate shall have the care, management and investment of the estate, shall manage the estate frugally
and shall apply the income and principal of the estate so far as necessary for the comfort and suitable
support and education of the ward, his children, and persons related by blood or marriage who are
dependent upon or entitled to support from him, or for any other purpose which the court deems to
be for the best interests of the ward, and the court may approve the making on behalf of the ward
of such agreements as the court determines to be for the ward’s best interests.”). In other
jurisdictions, as it was in the past in Illinois, guardians who perform similar functions are often
called “conservators.” See Bruce S. Ross, Conservatorship Litigation and Lawyer Liability: A
Guide Through the Maze, 31 STETSON L. REV. 757 (2002).
31. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-18(a-5) (2020).
32. See GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 7–10, 12–15 (explaining that guardianships
can be temporary, short-term or limited, depending on the circumstances, to ensure that a person
receives immediate protection).
33. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-5(a) (2020); accord GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2,
at 12.
34. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-5(b) (2020); accord GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2,
at 12.

2020]

Guarding the Guardians

1009

person available and willing to accept a guardianship appointment, as a
last resort, the Office of State Guardian will be appointed guardian.35
In all cases, however, the guardian can only be appointed by the court
as the result of a guardianship proceeding. Based on the evidence
presented by the parties at that proceeding, the court makes a
determination as to the need for guardianship and the type of
guardianship required, and appoints whomever the judge believes will
make the best guardian under the circumstances, regardless of the
guardian’s relation to the ward.36
The final type of guardian considered by the Probate Act is a guardian
ad litem, which, as the name suggests,37 is a guardian only for the
purposes of the guardianship proceeding itself. In other words, if so
appointed, the ward would have a guardian for purposes of the proceeding
during which the court will determine whether to appoint one of the
previously mentioned types of guardians for other specific purposes, such
as a guardian of the estate or a guardian of the person. As shall be
explained below, the notion of a guardian ad litem is not exclusive to the
Probate Act and, in fact, is more prevalent in other types of proceedings.
Given the limited duties of the guardians ad litem in a guardianship
proceeding under the Probate Act, it is often said that they operate as eyes
and ears of the court, whose main duty is owed to the court to help the
court make the decisions needed in the best interest of the ward.38 To
meet that responsibility, guardians ad litem are expected to interview the
35. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3955/31 (2020). In fact, the “Office of State Guardian attorneys
will contest or seek to vacate guardianship orders naming the State Guardian as guardian where a
suitable and willing alternative is available.” See PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP,
supra note 8, at 4–5. To avoid this problem, unless the Office of State Guardian petitions for its
own appointment as guardian, in all cases where a court appoints the State Guardian, the court shall
indicate as a finding of fact that no other suitable and willing person could be found to accept the
guardianship appointment. Id.
36. Ideally, the appointed guardian is responsible for overseeing a program intended to
maximize the ward’s self-reliance and independence. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-17(a) (2020)
(stating “[t]he guardian shall assist the ward in the development of maximum self-reliance and
independence.”). In reality, whether this is possible will depend largely on the ward’s ability to
exercise self-reliance and independence, which might be questionable since lack of that ability was
one of the reasons for seeking a guardianship in the first place. Id. § 11a-3(a). In order for a guardian
to be appointed, a petition must be filed in the court by an “interested person.” PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8, at 3. The petition includes basic information, such as the
name, date of birth and address of the person alleged to be in need of guardianship. 755 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/11a-8 (2020). A report must also be filed which includes a physician’s description of the
person’s physical and mental capacity along with their relevant evaluations which would enable
the court to determine the kind of guardianship needed. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-9 (2020);
accord GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 2, at 2–3.
37. The term “ad litem” means “for the purposes of the legal action only.” Ad Litem, Legal
Dictionary, LAW.COM, https://dictionary.law.com/Default.aspx?selected=2331 [https://perma.cc/
JX6U-SKES].
38. Right to Counsel Denied, supra note 6, at 837 n.9; see also infra notes 43–44.
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ward, inform him or her of their rights, and to investigate the
appropriateness of guardianship in order to prepare a report to the court.
If the ward opposes the opinions of the guardian ad litem, or disputes
the need for a guardianship, the court may appoint an attorney to represent
the ward. Thus, at a guardianship hearing the court may have to consider
the position of the parties as expressed by an attorney for the respondent
(possible ward), an attorney for the person who requested the
appointment of a guardian, a guardian ad litem, and the person or persons
who seek to be appointed as guardians.
Eventually, based on the court’s review of the information and
supporting evidence presented by all these interested parties, the court
decides whether to appoint a guardian, what type of guardian to appoint,
and whether to impose any special powers or limits to the authority of the
appointed guardian. For example, a guardian may be required to submit
an annual report to the court concerning the services provided to the ward.
Estate guardians must file inventories of the ward’s assets and periodic
accounting of estate receipts and disbursements.39 All estate expenditures
are subject to court review, and the guardian may be held accountable for
estate assets improperly managed.
II. GUARDIANS AD LITEM
In addition to all the types of guardianships recognized in the Probate
Act, Illinois law authorizes, and in some instances encourages, the use of
guardians ad litem in any divorce proceedings, delinquency proceedings,
and probate court proceedings that may have consequences on a minor,
including proceedings affecting child support, custody, visitation,
allocation of parental responsibilities, education, parentage, and property
interests.40 However, the concept of a guardian ad litem is very different
than the other guardianships recognized in the Probate Act. Again,
understanding the difference is key to addressing the issue of whether
guardians ad litem should be subject to liability for negligence.
The Latin phrase ad litem means “for the purposes of the legal action
only,”41 which suggests that a person appointed to serve as a guardian ad
litem is appointed to perform a very specific task in a very specific

39. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11a-17(b) (2020); see also PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8, at 6–7.
40. 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-1–5/11a-24 (2020). See Layton v. Miller, 322 N.E.2d 484, 487
(Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (“It is the public policy of this State that rights of minors be carefully guarded.
No citation of authority need be given to state that one of the cardinal precepts of our law is that in
any court proceeding involving minors their best interest and welfare is the primary concern of the
court.”).
41. See supra note 37.
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context.42 The task of the traditional43 guardian ad litem is essentially to
gather information to share with the court in order to aid the court in
making judicial decisions affecting the disposition of a child and to use
the guardian’s judgment to seek whatever remedies he or she decides are
in the best interest of the child.44 Thus, while the guardian of the person
and the guardian of the estate are tasked to make decisions that
presumably the ward would have made, the guardian ad litem is tasked to
make his or her own decisions about the best interests of the ward, to
report those conclusions to the court, and to aid the court make a decision.
Thus, unlike the other types of guardians, the guardian ad litem typically
does not have the authority to act for the ward nor does he or she have
other tasks outside the context of the proceeding.45 In the context of a
guardianship proceeding itself, the guardian ad litem’s role is limited to
independently advising the court concerning the need for a
guardianship.46 Likewise, in a divorce proceeding the guardian ad litem
may be asked to determine the best interests of a minor in order to help
the court decide which parent should have custody.47 For this reason, it is
42. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, “[a] guardian ad litem is a special guardian appointed
by the court in which a particular litigation is pending to represent an infant, ward or unborn person
in that particular litigation, and the status of guardian ad litem exists only in that specific litigation
in which the appointment occurs.” Ad Litem, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
43. Using words like “traditional” or “typical” in reference to guardians ad litem is problematic
because courts (both in Illinois and nationally) are not always consistent in their use of the term.
As explained by one commentator:
Though appointed by courts pursuant to statute, the role and duties of the guardian ad
litem generally are not clearly defined. Depending upon the jurisdiction, guardians have
been appointed to be neutral fact-finders for the judiciary. They have also been appointed
to be advocates for minor children and in some instances they have been assigned a dual
role encompassing both advocacy and neutral fact-finding. Though the confusion as to
the guardian ad litem’s role may, at first glance, seem to be de minimis, it is of great
import both to the issue of the personal liability of the court appointed guardian ad litem
and the immunity a guardian may have from said liability.
Mahaffey, supra note 1, at 281. In Illinois, the “dual role” of guardian ad litem and advocate was
ruled to be a conflict of interest in juvenile delinquency proceedings, but not in civil cases. See,
e.g., People v. Austin M., 975 N.E.2d 22, 42 (Ill. 2012) (“We conclude, therefore, that the interests
of justice are best served by finding a per se conflict when minor’s counsel in a delinquency
proceeding simultaneously functions as both defense counsel and guardian ad litem.”); A Good Step
in the Right Direction, supra note 6, at 165–66 (discussing the confusion the dual role can create);
The Right to Counsel Denied, supra note 6, at 834 (discussing same).
44. The Right to Counsel Denied, supra note 6, at 857–58; PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO
GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8, at 11–12.
45. See Villalobos v. Cicero Sch. Dist. 99, 841 N.E.2d 87, 93 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (explaining
that although a guardian ad litem may provide recommendations to the court, the guardian lacks
authority to make decisions affecting the ward).
46. PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 8, at 11–12.
47. The Marriage Act states that the guardian ad litem shall investigate the facts of the case and
interview the child and the parties. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506(a)(2) (2020). Using that
information, the guardian should prepare a written report to the court regarding his or her
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often said that while other types of guardians owe a duty to the ward, the
guardian ad litem owes a duty to the court.48
This is also the case in juvenile delinquency proceedings, which
explains why the Supreme Court of Illinois has decided it would be a
conflict of interest to assign an attorney to serve as advocate for the child
and as a guardian ad litem at the same time.49 Likewise, because the role
of the guardian ad litem is very different than the role of a lawyer for the
minor, the distinction makes all the difference when it comes to
determining whether the guardian can be subject to liability for
negligence.
A lawyer appointed to appear as an attorney for a minor is expected to
provide “independent legal counsel for the child”50 and, thus, owes the
child the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
representation that are owed to an adult client.51 As explained by the New
recommendations in accordance with the best interest of the child. Id. The report is not confidential;
it is made available to all parties. Id. In addition, the guardian ad litem may be called as a witness
for purposes of cross-examination regarding the guardian ad litem’s report or recommendations.
Id.
48. See, e.g., In re Mark W., 888 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ill. 2008) (explaining that “a guardian ad litem
functions as the ‘eyes and ears of the court’ and not as the ward’s attorney.”); see also K.O.H. ex
rel. Bax v. Huhn, 69 S.W.3d 142, 146 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (stating that the guardian ad litem’s
“principal allegiance is to the court”).
49. People v. Austin M., 975 N.E.2d 22 (Ill. 2012). Allowing an attorney to fulfill the roles of
attorney and guardian ad litem at the same time threatens all of the basic elements of the attorneyclient relationship and the ethical duty created to protect them and is, therefore, considered to be a
conflict of interest. Id. at 42. This is so because an attorney who is also a guardian will be in a
position of having to choose between advancing the client’s desired objectives, as required by the
duties prescribed in the rules of professional conduct, or violating those duties in order to advocate
for what the attorney believes to be in the best interest of the minor. Id. In addition, confusion over
the role of an attorney can affect the duty of confidentiality owed to a minor. Id. at 36. An attorney
for a minor, just like any other attorney with any other type of client, is bound by the duty of
confidentiality expressed in the rules of professional conduct. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.14. For this reason, the attorney has an obligation to keep information related to the
representation confidential unless an exception to the rule applies. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 1.6; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). In contrast, to fulfill the
duties of a guardian ad litem, the attorney serving as guardian ad litem must prepare a report and
be available to testify at the request of the court, even regarding confidential information. For a
detailed discussion of the issues raised by the appointment of lawyers to serve as advocates and
guardians at the same time, see generally The Right to Counsel Denied, supra note 6, and A Good
Step in the Right Direction, supra note 6.
50. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506(a)(1) (2020).
51. See supra note 49 and accompanying text; Nichols v. Fahrenkamp, 113 N.E.3d 1183, 1189
(Ill. App. Ct. 2018) (“Such a relationship between a guardian and a ward is equivalent to the
relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary.” (citations omitted)). This approach to an
attorney’s duty is also reflected in the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Illinois Rule 1.14(a)
states: “When a client’s capacity to make adequately considered decisions in connection with a
representation is diminished, whether because of minority, mental impairment or for some other
reason, the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship
with the client.” ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14(a). Also, the comment to Rule 1.14
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Jersey Supreme Court in a case involving a guardian ad litem for a client
with Down syndrome,
[T]he attorney’s role differs from that of a guardian ad litem . . . . A
court-appointed counsel’s services are to the child. Counsel acts as an
independent legal advocate . . . and takes an active part in the hearing,
ranging from subpoenaing and cross-examining witnesses to appealing
the decision, if warranted. If the purpose of the appointment is for legal
advocacy, then counsel would be appointed. A court-appointed
guardian ad litem’s services are to the court . . . . The [guardian ad
litem] acts as an independent fact finder, investigator and evaluator as
to what furthers the best interests of the child. The [guardian ad litem]
submits a written report to the court and is available to testify. If the
purpose of the appointment is for independent investigation and fact
finding, then a [guardian ad litem] would be appointed.52

If a lawyer is negligent in performing his or her duties as an advocate
for the child, including by acting with a conflict of interest for attempting
to perform as a guardian at the same time that the lawyer is appointed to
act as a lawyer, the lawyer is subject to liability for malpractice just like
any other lawyer would be. On the other hand, as shall be discussed below
in more detail, an attorney acting as guardian ad litem may be entitled to
immunity for negligence if the conduct in question was not that of an
advocate for the minor.53
Because the use of guardians ad litem is more prevalent under the
terms of the Marriage Act, it should be noted that this Act recognizes yet
another layer of protection for minors by authorizing the appointment of
a so-called “child representative” for the minor in addition to a guardian
ad litem and an attorney.54 According to the Marriage Act, an appointed
explicitly states that “children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or
twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings concerning
their custody.” Id. r. 1.14 cmt. 1.
52. In re M.R., 638 A.2d 1274, 1283 (N.J. 1994).
53. See 3 RONALD E. MALLEN, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 28:42 (2020 ed.) (explaining that an
attorney may be entitled to the defense of judicial immunity for an alleged error made while acting
as guardian ad litem depending on whether the guardian acted as an advocate or as a functionary of
the court).
54. The Marriage Act defines the duties of a child representative as follows:
The child representative shall advocate what the child representative finds to be in the
best interests of the child after reviewing the facts and circumstances of the case. The
child representative shall meet with the child and the parties, investigate the facts of the
case, and encourage settlement and the use of alternative forms of dispute resolution.
The child representative shall have the same authority and obligation to participate in the
litigation as does an attorney for a party and shall possess all the powers of investigation
as does a guardian ad litem. The child representative shall consider, but not be bound by,
the expressed wishes of the child. A child representative shall have received training in
child advocacy or shall possess such experience as determined to be equivalent to such
training by the chief judge of the circuit where the child representative has been
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child representative shall advocate what the child representative believes
to be in the best interests of the child after reviewing the facts and
circumstances of the case.55 In this way, the child representative is a
hybrid figure, somewhere between a guardian ad litem and an attorney.
He or she acts as an advocate for the child but has a different type of
authority to make decisions than an attorney for a child.
An attorney representing a minor is expected to maintain an attorneyclient relationship with the client, which means the attorney has to respect
the client’s autonomy to make decisions and, therefore, abide by the
client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation.56 A
child representative is an advocate for the child who does not have to
abide by such decisions and, to the contrary, has the authority to do
something a lawyer rarely, if ever, has the authority to do: to make
decisions for the client after independently forming an opinion about
what the representative believes to be the best interests of the child.57
appointed. The child representative shall not disclose confidential communications made
by the child, except as required by law or by the Rules of Professional Conduct. The
child representative shall not render an opinion, recommendation, or report to the court
and shall not be called as a witness, but shall offer evidence-based legal arguments. The
child representative shall disclose the position as to what the child representative intends
to advocate in a pre-trial memorandum that shall be served upon all counsel of record
prior to the trial. The position disclosed in the pre-trial memorandum shall not be
considered evidence. The court and the parties may consider the position of the child
representative for purposes of a settlement conference.
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/506(a)(3) (2020).
55. Id.
56. Alberto Bernabe, Waiving Goodbye to a Fundamental Right: Allocation of Authority
Between Attorneys and Clients and the Right to a Public Trial, 38 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 2 nn.2–3 (2013)
[hereinafter Waiving Goodbye to a Fundamental Right] (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019)); RONALD ROTUNDA & JOHN DZIENKOWSKI,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT’S GUIDE § 1.2-2(a) (2014) (stating that the lawyer is
the agent—not the guardian—of the client; lawyer must “abide by the client’s decisions concerning
the objectives of the representation”).
57. Even in those rare circumstances where attorneys are allowed to use their own judgment to
protect the interests of younger clients or clients with diminished capacity, it is clear that the
lawyer’s conduct should be guided more by respect toward the client’s autonomy rather than by
what the lawyer may think may be better for the client. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 1.14 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). Thus, according to generally accepted notions of
professional responsibility, an attorney should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute
his or her judgment for that of the client. Id. On this point, the comment to rule 1.14 states that “[i]n
taking any protective action, the lawyer should be guided by such factors as the wishes and values
of the client to the extent known, the client’s best interests and the goals of intruding into the client’s
decision making autonomy to the least extent feasible, maximizing client capacities and respecting
the client’s family and social connections.” Id. at cmt. 5. Thus, rules of professional conduct
demand that, other than in some rare circumstances, attorneys for minors and those with diminished
capacity abide by the same duties owed to an adult client. This is why in cases where the lawyer is
in doubt as to the best way to proceed, the suggested course of action is not to make decisions for
the client but to ask for the appointment of a guardian other than the lawyer himself or herself. See
State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d 783, 786 (N.M. 2004) (holding that, “[a]lthough counsel may advise
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Thus, the child representative under the Marriage Act is essentially a
lawyer with special powers.58 As explained in the Act, the child
representative
shall have the same authority and obligation to participate in the
litigation as does an attorney for a party and shall possess all the powers
of investigation as does a guardian ad litem. The child representative
shall consider, but not be bound by, the expressed wishes of the
child. . . . The child representative shall not disclose confidential
communications made by the child, except as required by law or by the
Rules of Professional Conduct. The child representative shall not render
an opinion, recommendation, or report to the court and shall not be
called as a witness, but shall offer evidence-based legal arguments.59

In other words, just like in the case of a guardian ad litem, the duties
of the child representative are limited to the particular proceeding and are
based on the representative’s own conclusion as to the best interests of
the minor. Yet, unlike in the case of a guardian ad litem, the child
representative acts as an advocate and, therefore, owes a duty to the minor
and not to the court.
III. SHOULD GUARDIANS AD LITEM BE SUBJECT TO
POSSIBLE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE?
There should be no question that the position of a guardian ad litem is
extremely important. Regardless of the type of proceeding in which
guardians are appointed, the lives of their wards, whether minors or
people with disabilities, can be severely affected if the person serving as
a guardian is incompetent or negligent. Both the ward and the court
depend on the ability of the guardians ad litem to do their job properly.
For this reason, it is expected that guardians will fulfill their duties fully,
carefully, and non-negligently.60
the client on counsel’s view of the client’s best interests, counsel is ultimately required to advance
the client’s expressed wishes”). See also Annette Appell, Decontextualizing the Child Client: The
Efficacy of the Attorney-Client Model for Very Young Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1959–
60 (1996) (stating that “lawyers may not normally substitute their own opinions regarding the goals
of the representation”).
58. As the court explains in Nichols, “the child representative . . . acts as an ‘advocate’ for the
child’s best interests. Like the child’s attorney, the child’s representative ‘shall have the same
authority and obligation to participate in the litigation as does an attorney for a party.’” Nichols v.
Fahrenkamp, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 17. Also like a traditional attorney, the child representative “shall
not render an opinion, recommendation, or report to the court and shall not be called as a witness
but shall offer evidence-based legal arguments.” Id. However, the child representative “shall
possess all the powers of investigation as does guardian ad litem” and is not bound by the child’s
expressed wishes when determining the child’s best interests. Id.
59. Id.
60. Dixon v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 798, 802 (W.D.S.C. 1961) (noting that guardians
should be as careful not to do anything, or allow anything to be done, to the prejudice of the ward’s
interest).
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Unfortunately, that is not always the case and courts have had to
determine whether to recognize a possible cause of action against
guardians for injuries caused by their negligence. In some cases, courts
have stated that guardians ad litem should be subject to liability,61 but the
majority view is that guardians ad litem should be protected from liability
in most cases. It is important to say “in most cases” when affirming that
guardians ad litem should be immune to liability because it depends not
on the label attached to their appointment but on the actual tasks the court
asks them to perform and the person to whom the duty to perform those
tasks is owed.
If, as mentioned above, the guardian performs tasks at the request of
the court to help the court make a decision, the guardian is usually thought
of as an extension of the court and therefore owes a duty to the court.
And, since judges are immune from liability,62 by extension of the
concept of judicial immunity, guardians ad litem are usually also granted
immunity.63 Thus,
[a]n attorney may be entitled to the defense of judicial immunity for an
alleged error made while acting as a guardian ad litem. The controlling
analysis is whether the guardian acted as an advocate or as a fiduciary
of the court. In custody matters, the guardian is considered an agent of
the court with investigative powers rather than as counsel for the
minor. . . . Under this rationale, judicial immunity has been extended to
attorney guardians.64

This view is not uncommon. Many courts have held that when
someone acts in a quasi-judicial role, the immunity long recognized for
judges so that they can perform their duties without fear of retaliation
from unhappy litigants applies too. And many courts have held that

61. See id. at 802–03 (stating that if in consequence of the culpable omission or neglect of the
guardian ad litem the interests of the infant are sacrificed, the guardian may be punished for his
neglect as well as made to respond to the infant for the damage sustained).
62. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 14 (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553–54 (1967))
(explaining that “[f]ew doctrines were more solidly established at common law than the immunity
of judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction”).
63. Id. at ¶ 15 (first citing Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2012); then citing Briscoe
v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 335 (1983); and then citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978)).
64. MALLEN ET AL., supra note 53, § 28:42 (footnotes omitted) (first citing Sarkisian v.
Benjamin, 820 N.E.2d 263 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); then citing Fox v. Wills, 890 A.2d 726 (Md.
2006); and then citing Berndt v. Molepske, 565 N.W.2d 549 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997)). The authors
also cite cases from Colorado, New Mexico, Idaho, and Wisconsin to illustrate how those
jurisdictions have addressed the issue of whether a guardian ad litem should be immune from
possible liability for negligence based on whether they perform as a lawyer for the ward or as an
extension of the court. See, e.g., Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Colo. 1990); Collins ex rel.
Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40 (N.M. 1991); Hunnicutt v. Sewell, 219 P.3d 529 (N.M. Ct. App.
2009); McKay v. Owens, 937 P.2d 1222 (Idaho 1997); Molepske, 565 N.W.2d 549.
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guardians ad litem act in a quasi-judicial role because their role is to assist
the court in making a decision.65
65. MALLEN ET AL., supra note 53, § 28:42 (stating that court appointed guardians, like lawyers
who function in a judicial capacity, are entitled to immunity); Inga Laurent, “This One’s for the
Children:” The Time Has Come to Hold Guardians Ad Litem Responsible for Negligent Injury and
Death to the Their Charges, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 655, 658 (2004) (explaining that immunity is
routinely granted to guardians who function within a quasi-judicial role); Jennifer Paige Hanft,
Attorney for Child Versus Guardian ad Litem: Wyoming Creates a Hybrid, But Is it a Formulation
for Malpractice?, 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 381, 394 (1999). Also, although they use different
language to refer to the extent of immunity, Texas, Florida, Washington State, South Carolina,
Michigan, Tennessee, and Maine have statutes that specifically afford statutory immunity to
guardians for acts committed within the scope of their appointments. See TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 107.009 (2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.405 (2020); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.105 (2020);
S.C. CODE § 63-11-560 (2020); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 371-149 (2020). Myriad decisions in state and federal court also affirm the immunity enjoyed by
guardians ad litem. See Widoff v. Wiens, 45 P.3d 1232, 1235 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that a
guardian ad litem appointed by the court to assist in child custody dispute was entitled to judicial
immunity from lawsuit because guardian must be allowed to perform his or her duties without fear
of litigation, and children would suffer if the decisions of a guardian ad litem were influenced by
the threat of litigation); Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 331 P.3d 915, 918 (N.M. 2014) (holding that
immunity is granted to a guardian ad litem who is acting as an arm of the court in order to prevent
the guardian’s work from being compromised by the threat of liability); Surprenant v. Mulcrone,
44 A.3d 465, 467 (N.H. 2012) (holding that in custody related proceeding, court appointed guardian
ad litem was entitled to immunity for any alleged negligence in actions taken in her official capacity
in preparing and presenting report to court); Hunnicutt, 219 P.3d at 534 (holding that immunity
attaches to a guardian ad litem when the appointment contemplates investigation on behalf of the
court into the fairness and reasonableness of a settlement); Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970
(7th Cir. 2009) (stating that guardians ad litem operate as arms of the court, “much like special
masters, and deserve protection from harassment by disappointed litigants just as judges do”);
Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 157 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that state courts have reasoned that,
“absent absolute immunity, the specter of litigation would hang over a [guardian ad litem’s] head,
thereby inhibiting a [guardian ad litem] in performing duties essential to the welfare of the child”);
Offutt v. Kaplan, 884 F. Supp. 1179, 1192 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that a guardian ad litem acts as
a judicial officer and was entitled to immunity); Billups v. Scott, 571 N.W.2d 603, 607 (Neb. 1997)
(stating that a guardian ad litem is entitled to immunity for any suit for damages based on
performance of duties which are within scope of guardian’s authority); Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d
40, 51 (N.M. 1991) (holding that immunity for guardian ad litem provided that the appointment
contemplates investigation on behalf of the court into the fairness and reasonableness of a
settlement and its effect on the minor); Marr v. Me. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 215 F. Supp. 2d 261,
268 (D. Me. 2002) (holding that immunity attaches when guardian ad litem performs certain
delegated duties because of intimate relationship between a guardian ad litem and court in judicial
process); Kennedy v. State, 730 A.2d 1252, 1255 (Me. 1999) (stating that a guardian ad litem in
custody proceedings was entitled to immunity because she functioned as an arm of the court and
was acting on behalf of the court in its efforts to determine what would be in the best interests of
the children); Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990) (granting immunity to courtappointed guardian ad litem for minor children in a domestic relations dispute); Tindell v.
Rogosheske, 428 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn. 1988) (stating that a guardian ad litem is immune from
negligence for acts within the scope of the exercise of statutory responsibilities); Dahl v. Dahl, 744
F.3d 623, 631 (10th Cir. 2014) (holding that guardians ad litem are entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity); Carrubba v. Moskowitz, 877 A.2d 773, 783–785 (Conn. 2005) (determining that a
court-appointed attorney for minor child most closely resembles a guardian ad litem and is entitled
to absolute immunity); Babbe v. Peterson, 514 N.W.2d 726, 727 (Iowa 1994) (noting that guardian
ad litem acting on behalf of the appointing court was entitled to judicial immunity); Paige K.B. v.
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There would be nothing more to discuss if that was all there is to the
issue. It makes sense to say that a guardian whose task is to help the court
operates as an arm of the court and should, therefore, be protected from
possible liability. The problem in Illinois, however, is that the case that
brought the issue to the supreme court for review did not fit this mold.
A. Nichols v. Fahrenkamp: Background
The Supreme Court of Illinois had not considered whether a guardian
ad litem should be immune from possible liability for negligence until
Nichols v. Fahrenkamp was decided in the summer of 2019. Following
the generally accepted rule, the court decided that guardians ad litem
should be granted immunity. This general principle is not surprising, but
the result in the case is surprising because it is not clear that the facts
supported it.
The facts of Nichols are relatively straight forward. When the plaintiff,
Alexis Nichols, was eleven years old she received a $600,000 settlement
in a lawsuit for injuries she sustained in a car accident.66 Because Alexis
was a minor at the time, the probate court appointed her mother as a
guardian of the person and of the estate67 and, as such, was ordered to
place the settlement money in a restricted account from which no
withdrawal could be made unless it was approved by the court.68
Presumably, that was all that would be needed since by doing so the court
was, in effect, appointing a plenary guardian. However, without
explaining its reasons, delineating specifics tasks, nor pointing out the
statute upon which the decision was based, the court also appointed a

Molepske, 580 N.W.2d 289, 296 (Wis. 1998) (holding that a guardian ad litem appointed by the
court to represent the best interests of a child in a child custody case is entitled to absolute quasijudicial immunity to prevent harassment and intimidation); Fleming v. Asbill, 483 S.E.2d 751, 756
(S.C. 1997) (holding that guardians ad litem in private custody proceedings are entitled to common
law immunity); McKay, 937 P.2d 1222 (holding that a guardian ad litem should be considered to
be acting as an arm of the court and entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity); Lewittes v. Lobis,
164 F. App’x 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that a guardian ad litem is entitled to quasi-judicial
immunity); McCuen v. Polk Cty., 893 F.2d 172, 174 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting that a child protection
worker was comparable to a prosecutor and entitled to at least qualified immunity); Cok v.
Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining guardian ad litem functioned as and agent of
the court had have absolute quasi-judicial immunity for activities integrally related to the judicial
process); Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting a guardian ad litem as
absolutely immune when acting as an integral part of the judicial process); Kurzawa v. Mueller,
732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that a guardian ad litem enjoys absolute immunity).
66. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 3.
67. The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court said that the mother was appointed “as her
guardian to administer her estate,” id., while the opinion of the appellate court stated that the mother
was appointed as a guardian of the person and the estate, Nichols v. Fahrenkamp, 113 N.E.3d 1183,
1184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
68. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 3.
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lawyer as what the court referred to as a guardian ad litem.69 This lawyer
was the eventual defendant in the case, David Fahrenkamp.
Between 2005 and 2010, Alexis’s mother requested permission to
withdraw money from the account holding the settlement money for
many different reasons, including to pay taxes, to buy a car, and to pay
for school costs, among others. All the requests were approved by the
court.70 Presumably, one of Fahrenkamp’s duties was to review these
requests and to recommend to the court whether the court should approve
them. Fahrenkamp approved all the requests but the plaintiff alleged that
he failed to verify whether the requests were accurate or legitimate before
recommending approval by the court.71
Soon after Alexis reached majority, her mother filed a Final Report
certifying that plaintiff had received access to the remaining amount of
money available in the settlement fund account, and in 2010, the court
ordered that the guardianship appointment was no longer needed and
officially ended it.72
Two years later, Alexis sued her mother for conversion, unjust
enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty,
among other claims, alleging that her mother misappropriated some of
the funds and used them solely for the mother’s benefit.73 Following a
bench trial, the court found in favor of the plaintiff in part, but denied full
recovery precisely because Alexis had been appointed a guardian ad
litem.74 In other words, the court relied on attorney Fahrenkamp’s status
as guardian ad litem to limit plaintiff’s remedies against her mother. As
explained by the court: “This court cannot fault [plaintiff’s mother] for
not having receipts for each item provided to [plaintiff] and cannot and
will not charge back for items approved in another file while [plaintiff]
had a guardian ad litem who approved the estimates and expenditures.”75
Taking the hint, Alexis then filed a malpractice action against attorney
Fahrenkamp claiming that he failed to protect her interests by allowing
her mother to convert settlement funds for the mother’s personal
benefit.76 She claimed, among other things, that Fahrenkamp negligently
performed his duties as guardian ad litem by failing to monitor the
requests made by plaintiff’s mother to determine if they were truly for the
69. Id. ¶¶ 33–34.
70. See Nichols, 113 N.E.3d at 1184–85.
71. Id. at 1185.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1184–85 (finding that the mother was not liable for the requested amount because the
plaintiff had a “guardian ad litem who approved the estimates and expenditures”).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1185.
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plaintiff’s benefit, failing to verify that the money was actually used for
the plaintiff’s benefit, and failing to report any irregularities to the court.77
In response, Fahrenkamp filed a motion to dismiss and, later, a motion
for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not meet the
elements of the cause of action because she could not show that he had a
duty as guardian ad litem to independently monitor the mother’s use of
funds following the court’s approval of distributions.78 More importantly,
he also argued that even if there was a duty, the plaintiff could not support
the cause of action because he was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for
his actions as a court-appointed guardian ad litem.79
After years of litigation, the trial court granted Fahrenkamp’s motion
and dismissed the complaint, holding that Fahrenkamp’s duty as a
guardian was limited to reviewing the mother’s requests and to making
recommendations to the court, and that he was entitled to immunity for
that type of duty.80 In other words, the court held that Fahrenkamp had
immunity for the duty to review the mother’s requests for withdrawals of
funds, and had no duty to follow up on the use of those funds after they
were approved by the court based on his recommendations.
As a result, the plaintiff was left with no remedy for the alleged
conversion of her assets. According to the trial court, the plaintiff could
not recover against the mother because the plaintiff’s guardian ad litem
had approved the expenditures, and she could not recover from the
guardian ad litem because he was immune from liability given that the
court order appointing him as guardian ad litem lacked any specificity
regarding his duties.81
In 2018, the appellate court reversed and remanded, holding that
Fahrenkamp was not entitled to immunity because of his role in the
process and because finding against the plaintiff would mean that the
appointment of a guardian ad litem was nothing more than an empty
gesture.82 The defendant then appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.
77. Id. In addition, plaintiff alleged that attorney Fahrenkamp never met with her or talked to
her during the time he was acting as her guardian ad litem, and that he never asked her if the
statements contained in her mother’s petitions to withdraw monies from the settlement account
were accurate. Id. Moreover, she claimed that if Fahrenkamp had spoken with her, she would have
told him that the expenses her mother claimed needed to be paid out of plaintiff’s settlement account
either did not exist, were grossly inflated, or were covered expenses that plaintiff herself was
already paying for out of other proceeds. Id.
78. Nichols v. Fahrenkamp, No. 13-L-1395, 2016 WL 11576860, at *1 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 22,
2016) (“[D]efendant asserts . . . that there is no evidence that he breached any duty actually owed
to the plaintiff in his role as guardian ad litem.”).
79. Nichols v. Fahrenkamp, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 7.
80. Id.
81. Id. ¶ 8.
82. Nichols, 113 N.E.3d 1183. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Goldenhersh argued that
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The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and, in June 2019,
reversed the Illinois appellate court.83 Notably, the court recognized the
problems that make Nichols a difficult case: that the phrase “guardian ad
litem” did not have a consistent meaning,84 that the guardian in this case
was not clearly appointed under any one of the statutes that recognize
guardianships, that the Probate Act and the Marriage Act have disparate
language pertaining to guardians ad litem,85 and that the court that
appointed Fahrenkamp as a guardian ad litem did not specify his role or
specific tasks.
Yet, despite the fact that these problems should have made a difference
in the analysis, the court concluded that because most Illinois cases
consider guardians ad litem as aides of the courts rather than as advocates,
they should be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity as long as the functions
actually performed are consistent with that of “a witness and not an
advocate.”86 In doing so, the court explained a good way to approach the
issue, but it is questionable whether it applied the analysis correctly to the
facts of the case.
Whether the result in the case is justified is consequential for two
reasons. First, because without a right to sue the defendant, a minor for
whom a lower court appoints both a plenary guardian and a guardian ad
litem would be left without a remedy. It is strange that if the probate court
had assigned just a plenary guardian the plaintiff might have a claim, but
because the court appointed more people in order to protect the interests
of the minor, the minor is left with no remedy at all. Second, as the court
points out, there is still a significant discrepancy between the approach to
the figure of the guardian ad litem under the Marriage Act and the Probate
Act and it is not clear whether the result in this case will clarify the
analysis to be used in the future.

guardians ad litem are entitled to immunity because they do not serve as advocates for their wards
but as agents of the court. Id. at 1191 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). The dissent also expressed
concern that denying guardians ad litem immunity would discourage attorneys from accepting
appointments as guardians ad litem. Id.
83. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶¶ 51–53.
84. Id. ¶ 16 (citing Fox v. Wills, 890 A.2d 726, 732 (2006)) (stating that American authorities
have not always used this phrase consistently and that “[t]here is little uniformity in the case law
and statutes of other states with regard to the functions, duties, and immunities of ‘guardians ad
litem.’”). The court also discussed how the concept of the guardian ad litem is different in the
Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and the Probate Act. Id. ¶¶ 29–33.
85. Id. ¶ 49 (encouraging the General Assembly to review these acts in order to ensure consistent
use of the phrase “guardian ad litem” across statutes).
86. Id. at ¶ 35.
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B. Nichols v. Fahrenkamp: Analysis
In the abstract, the conclusion that guardians ad litem are entitled to
immunity as long as the functions actually performed are consistent with
those of an “arm of the court” and not those of an advocate is not
unreasonable. In fact, this has been the view in many jurisdictions for
some time.87 The problem with the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion in
Nichols, however, is not in the conclusion it reaches but in the way it
applied the analysis in order to reach it.
First of all, because the texts of the Marriage Act and the Probate Act
do not use the term “guardian ad litem” in the same way, the mere fact
that attorney Fahrenkamp had the title of “guardian ad litem” does not
explain what exactly his role was in the case.
To understand the different possible roles an attorney can play, it is
easier to start by looking at the Marriage Act, which defines the
appointment of a guardian ad litem in more detail. According to the
Marriage Act, for the types of proceedings covered by the Act, the court
can protect the interests of a minor by assigning him or her the help of
any combination of an attorney, a guardian ad litem, or a child
representative. As explained above, a lawyer appointed to appear as an
attorney for a child is expected to provide independent legal
representation for the child and, thus, owes the child the same duties of
loyalty, confidentiality, and competent representation that are owed to an
adult client.88 This view is reflected in the Rules of Professional Conduct,
according to which an attorney representing a minor should act as an
advocate for the minor and should avoid trying to decide for the minor
what may be in the minor’s best interest.89 Moreover, even in emergency
87. See Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 14 (stating that court appointed guardians, like lawyers who
function in a judicial capacity, are entitled to immunity). The Nichols court cited a number of cases
in support of its conclusion. See, e.g., Kimbrell v. Kimbrell, 331 P.3d 915, 919 (N.M. 2014);
Fleming v. Asbill, 483 S.E.2d 751, 756 (S.C. 1997); McKay v. Owens, 937 P.2d 1222, 1231 (Idaho
1997); Barr v. Day, 879 P.2d 912 (Wash. 1994); Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir.
2009) (holding that child representative deserves immunity and suggesting that guardians ad litem
also have quasi-judicial immunity); Dahl v. Dahl, 744 F.3d 623, 630 (10th Cir. 2014) (widespread
recognition that quasi-judicial immunity protects guardians ad litem); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1989); Gardner v. Parson, 874 F.2d 131, 146 (3d Cir. 1989); Hughes v. Long, 242
F.3d 121, 127 (3d Cir. 2001); Heisterkamp v. Pacheco, 47 N.E.3d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016) (holding
that when a court-appointed individual acts to give advice to the court regarding the best interest of
the minor for use in the court’s decision-making process, that individual must be cloaked with the
same immunity as the court).
88. See supra notes 49 and 51.
89. Although establishing an attorney-client relationship with a minor raises some concerns
because of the fact that the client is, in fact, a minor, the general principles reflected in the rules do
not change much. This conclusion is expressed in Rule 1.14 of the Illinois Rules of Professional
Conduct, which explains the approach an attorney must follow when establishing an attorney-client
relationship with a client with diminished capacity. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14. The
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situations, an attorney is only permitted to use his or her judgment to
make decisions for a minor client in limited circumstances and, even in
those circumstances, substituting the attorney’s judgment for that of the
minor client should end as soon as it is possible.90 In addition, because
the Marriage Act and the Rules of Professional Conduct expect an
attorney for a minor to act like an attorney for any other client, it follows
that if a lawyer is negligent in performing his or her duties as an advocate
for a child, the lawyer is subject to liability for malpractice just like any
other lawyer would be.
In contrast, the relationship between a guardian ad litem and a minor
is fundamentally different. An attorney’s role is to be a legal advocate for
his or her client, which means that the attorney has a duty to advance the
client’s objectives as defined by the client. The role of the guardian ad
litem under the Marriage Act, on the other hand, is to form an opinion as
to what is in the best interest of the child, based on information gathered
and later shared with the court in order to aid the court in making judicial
decisions affecting the disposition of the child. Thus, the attorneyadvocate acts at the request of the minor-client and, therefore, owes his
or her duties to the child including a duty of confidentiality. In contrast,
the guardian ad litem acts at the request of the court and owes his or her
duties to the court, which often means that the guardian ad litem can’t
general principle expressed in the rule is that regardless of the age of the client, the attorney should
maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with his or her client, which, of course, means the
attorney has a duty to comply with all the duties any attorney owes an adult client. See supra notes
49 and 51.
90. The comments to the rules of professional conduct discuss the proper approach to take in
emergency situations as follows:
In an emergency where the health, safety or a financial interest of a person with seriously
diminished capacity is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a lawyer may
take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the person is unable to establish
a client-lawyer relationship or to make or express considered judgments about the matter,
when the person or another acting in good faith on that person’s behalf has consulted
with the lawyer. Even in such an emergency, however, the lawyer should not act unless
the lawyer reasonably believes that the person has no other lawyer, agent or other
representative available, except when that representative’s actions or inaction threaten
immediate and irreparable harm to the person. The lawyer should take legal action on
behalf of the person only to the extent reasonably necessary to maintain the status quo
or otherwise avoid imminent and irreparable harm. A lawyer who undertakes to represent
a person in such an exigent situation has the same duties under these Rules as the lawyer
would with respect to a client. A lawyer who acts on behalf of a person with seriously
diminished capacity in an emergency should keep the confidences of the person as if
dealing with a client, disclosing them only to the extent necessary to accomplish the
intended protective action. The lawyer should disclose to any tribunal involved and to
any other counsel involved the nature of his or her relationship with the person. The
lawyer should take steps to regularize the relationship or implement other protective
solutions as soon as possible. Normally, a lawyer would not seek compensation for such
emergency actions taken.
ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.14 cmts. 9–10.
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guarantee confidentiality since he or she must prepare a report and be
available to testify at the request of the court. Given these important
distinctions, a person performing the role of a guardian ad litem under the
Marriage Act has a good argument for immunity from liability since his
or her task is essentially to help the court make a decision that will affect
the child.
Originally, neither the Marriage Act nor the Probate Act made these
important distinctions between an advocate and a guardian ad litem and
treated all guardians as advocates. However, the understanding of the
duties of a guardian ad litem under the Marriage Act has changed and
now it is clear that there is a distinction, which, in turn, can affect the
claim for immunity.
On the other hand, the language in early cases under the Probate Act
that allowed courts to hold that the role of the guardian ad litem was
equivalent to that of an attorney-advocate,91 and the section of the Probate
Act that authorizes the court to appoint a guardian for a minor has
remained essentially unchanged.92 In fact, in its decision in Nichols, the
court cites several cases to illustrate that courts understood guardians ad
litem were expected to act like traditional attorneys under the Probate
Act.93 The court also points out that it is notable that the Illinois General
Assembly has amended other sections of the Probate Act to reflect the
newer usage of the phrase “guardian ad litem” but has not amended the
section related to guardians ad litem for minors.94 For example, prior to
1995, the section of the Probate Act related to the appointment of
guardians for adults with intellectual disabilities allowed a court to
appoint a guardian ad litem “to represent the respondent,” just as the Act
currently provides for guardianship proceedings involving minors.95
However, in 1995 the Illinois General Assembly updated the section on
91. Stunz v. Stunz, 23 N.E. 407 (Ill. 1890) (finding that guardian ad litem had an obligation to
mount a legal defense of the ward’s interests).
92. In Nichols the court admits that while the meaning of “guardian ad litem” in the Marriage
Act has changed, the text of the Probate Act has remained largely unchanged since it took effect in
1979, that parts of it are directly copied from a section of the earlier Probate Act of 1939 and that,
as the plaintiff in the case had pointed out, the text of article XI of the Probate Act continues to
allow courts to appoint a “guardian ad litem” to “represent” a minor. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990,
¶ 30.
93. Id. ¶¶ 25–26 (first citing In re Estate of Cohn, 419 N.E.2d 951 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (noting
the guardian ad litem provided the minor with legal representation before both the trial and appellate
courts); then citing Roth v. Roth, 367 N.E.2d 442 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (detailing how a guardian
acted as an “advocate” for two children by delivering a closing argument and filing an appeal on
the children’s behalf); then citing In re Estate of Azevedo, 450 N.E.2d 423 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)
(explaining that the guardian “represented” the minor in court appearances and contacts with social
services); and then citing Layton v. Miller, 322 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (holding that a
guardian ad litem should be appointed to represent the minors)).
94. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 31.
95. Id.
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guardians for adults with disabilities to read that a court can appoint a
guardian ad litem “to report to the court concerning the respondent’s best
interests.”96 This change evidently reflects the more traditional use of the
term “guardian ad litem,” and is similar to how the term is used in the
Marriage Act. Yet, the same amendment was not adopted for the section
on appointing guardians ad litem for minors.
Accordingly, it is fair to argue that as far as the appointment of
guardians ad litem for minors is concerned, the language in the Act, its
legislative history, and the case law that has interpreted it suggest that a
guardian ad litem under the Probate Act should be an advocate for the
minor. More importantly, this in turn suggests that the role of the guardian
ad litem under the Probate Act is more akin to that of a lawyer than that
of the traditional guardian ad litem under the Marriage Act. In other
words, based on the different approaches to the role of a guardian ad litem
under the two statutes it could be argued that a guardian ad litem
appointed under the Marriage Act operates as a representative of the court
and should be granted immunity from possible liability for negligence,
while a guardian ad litem for a minor appointed under the Probate Act,
acts more like an attorney and therefore should not be granted immunity.
For this reason, it would seem that one way to determine whether
someone serving as a guardian ad litem could be subject to liability would
be to determine which statutory authority was used to appoint the
guardian in the case. The problem in Nichols was that the lower court did
not state which statute the appointment was based on.
Facing this lack of important information, early on in the opinion in
Nichols, the court suggests that courts should look past the title attached
to the appointment and instead examine the tasks the person was asked to
perform based on what it called a “functional analysis,” first suggested
by the United States Supreme Court.97 According to this analysis, to
determine whether an actor’s role is sufficiently connected to the judicial
process to merit immunity, courts should consider
(a) the need to assure that the individual can perform his functions
without harassment or intimidation; (b) the presence of safeguards that
reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling
96. Id.
97. Id. ¶¶ 15–16; Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985). A few years after the Illinois
Supreme Court suggested this functional test, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois reiterated that rather than adopting blanket immunity for all guardians ad litem,
it would be best to analyze the functions of the guardian on a case-by-case basis in order to
determine if the guardian deserved to have immunity from possible civil liability. Kohl v. Murphy,
767 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Ill. 1991). See also Hanft, supra note 65, at 394–95 (noting that the
functional approach is widely accepted as an appropriate way to evaluate an attorney/guardian ad
litem’s potential vulnerability to suit by focusing on the guardian ad litem’s specific actions to
determine if he or she is, in fact, functioning as a quasi-judicial officer of the court).
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unconstitutional conduct; (c) insulation from political influence; (d) the
importance of precedent; (e) the adversary nature of the process; and (f)
the correctability of error on appeal.98

However, the functional test is also difficult to apply in the Nichols
case because, not only did the lower court not state which statute the
appointment was based on, the court also did not specify what
Fahrenkamp’s duties as a guardian ad litem were going to be. Therefore,
with no guidance from the appointing court on the duties assigned to be
performed, any analysis using the functionality test would have to be
based on an interpretation of either what the guardian should have been
doing or what the guardian actually did while serving as the guardian,
rather than on an evaluation of the tasks given to him by the court.
Interestingly, having explained the functional test, the court did not
seem to apply it in Nichols, and it can be argued that had it applied the
test, the result of the case should have been different. Aside from the first
factor—the need to assure that the individual can perform his or her
functions without harassment or intimidation—which is applicable to any
and all court appointments, the other factors did not support a finding of
immunity for Fahrenkamp, particularly since the process involved was
not adversary and since, without a remedy in tort, there would be no way
to correct the effects of the guardian’s misconduct on appeal.99
Instead of focusing on the different prongs of the functionality test,
much of the court’s discussion revolved around an attempt to explain the
consequences of appointing a guardian ad litem outside the basis of a
recognized statutory scheme with no explanation of assigned tasks. As
explained by the court, rather than looking at the title “guardian ad litem”
to determine whether Fahrenkamp deserved immunity, the court had to
consider the function he actually performed. As stated above, if the
guardian operated as an advocate for the minor, the argument for
immunity is weak, while if the guardian’s role was to assist the court in
making a decision, the argument for immunity is stronger.100 In this case,
however, the parties did not agree as to what the guardian’s function
was.101
98. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶¶ 15–16.
99. The fact that the minor could report the attorney serving as a guardian to the attorney’s
disciplinary agency does not constitute a remedy since, even if the agency imposed discipline on
the attorney, the result would not provide any benefit to the minor ward.
100. Hanft, supra note 65, at 395 (noting that when utilizing the functional approach, courts
hold guardians ad litem immune from malpractice when they function in their traditional role as an
agent or arm of the court, and are responsible for conducting their own investigation and for
reaching independent conclusions as to a child’s best interests, but the functional approach does
not support application of quasi-judicial immunity when a guardian ad litem acts as a legal
advocate).
101. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 16.
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Not surprisingly, Fahrenkamp argued that he filled the role of a
guardian ad litem as it is described in the Marriage Act. However,
because he was not, in fact, appointed under the authority of the Marriage
Act, nor was the proceeding a marriage dissolution action, he argued that
his appointment was based on a court’s inherent authority to name a
guardian whenever a child could be affected by a proceeding102 and that
a guardian so appointed fulfills a function similar to that of a guardian ad
litem under the Marriage Act.
Meanwhile, also not surprisingly, the plaintiff emphasized that the
guardian was appointed by the probate court and outside the context of a
marriage dissolution.103 More specifically, the plaintiff emphasized that
the relationship between the guardian and ward was equivalent to the
relationship between a trustee and a beneficiary and that guardians for
minors appointed by the probate court are appointed to advocate for the
rights of the child. Finally, she argued that because the proceeding at issue
was not an antagonistic marriage dissolution created by litigating parents,
the guardian did not need protection from unwarranted harassment and,
therefore, did not require immunity.104
With these two different arguments about the role of the guardian in
the case before it, the Illinois Supreme Court then proceeded to do what
it had stated at the beginning of the opinion it would not do. It adopted a
blanket rule for immunity for all guardians ad litem based on the concept
of the guardian ad litem in the abstract, or on the “title” itself, rather than
on the functionality test that would have required a closer look at the
actual tasks performed by the guardian. The court simply concluded that
Fahrenkamp’s role corresponded to a guardian ad litem under the current
version of the Marriage Act because “[m]ost Illinois cases in the twentyfirst century that involve a guardian ad litem treat that guardian ad litem
as a reporter or a witness and not as an advocate.”105 In other words, the
court concluded that Fahrenkamp’s role was akin to a guardian ad litem
under the Marriage Act because he was named to be a “guardian ad
litem”—rather than something else—and because some recent cases had
decided that the guardians ad litem in those cases operated as an extension

102. Id. ¶ 19 (citing In re Mark W., 888 N.E.2d 15 (Ill. 2008)) (concluding that the circuit court
had the inherent authority to appoint a guardian ad litem to report on the best interests of a mentally
disabled parent).
103. Id. ¶ 20.
104. Brief of Plaintiff/Appellee Alexis Nichols at 16, 19–23, Nichols v. Fahrenkamp, 113
N.E.3d 1183 (2018) (No. 5-16-0316), 2019 WL 847149, *16, *19–23.
105. See Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 35 (first citing citing In re Mark W., 888 N.E.2d 15 (Ill.
2008); then citing In re Estate of M.J.E., 2016 IL App (2d) 160457-U; and then citing In re Estate
of Cadle, 2014 IL App (1st) 131700-U).
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of the court106 without explaining if the role or tasks performed by
Fahrenkamp resembled the roles or tasks performed by the guardians in
those cases.107 Thus the court held that Fahrenkamp operated as a
guardian ad litem not because of what he actually was asked to do, nor
because of what he actually did, but because of what a “traditional”
guardian ad litem is supposed to do.
In fact, even after reading the opinions of the appellate court and the
supreme court, it is not totally clear what Fahrenkamp’s role in the case
was. It could be argued that he was appointed to help the court make
decisions regarding the child because the court had the ultimate power to
authorize the disbursement of the funds the mother wanted access to, and
the court was to rely on the guardian’s opinion to make the decision on
whether to authorize the use of the funds. In such a case, as the court
ultimately assumed, it could be said that he operated as a traditional
guardian ad litem (as described in the Marriage Act).
On the other hand, it could be argued that his role was to represent the
interests of the ward before the court by supervising the mother’s control
or use of the ward’s money and by advocating for the minor in court when
the mother wanted to use the minor’s money. In this case, the guardian
would have owed a duty to the minor ward, either because he had a
specific task to perform to protect the ward’s interest or because he would
be operating as an advocate. Analyzed this way, the guardian’s duty
would have been to protect the minor from the possibility of misconduct
by the guardian of the estate. And, more importantly, because this is a
duty owed to the child rather than to the court,108 the guardian would not
have been acting as a traditional guardian ad litem and should not have
been granted immunity.
This argument is similar to the analysis used by some courts in cases
involving guardians appointed to review a settlement agreement between
106. The court concluded that Fahrenkamp had been appointed as guardian under the inherent
authority recognized in In re Mark W. and that that case held that “[t]he traditional role of the
guardian ad litem is not to advocate for what the ward wants but, instead, to make a
recommendation to the court as to what is in the ward’s best interests.” Nichols, 2019 IL 123990,
¶ 38.
107. Interestingly, although the court cited more cases in which the guardian ad litem had been
held to represent a ward as an advocate, the court dismissed their importance because, in the court’s
words, they “date to earlier in Illinois’s history.” Id. ¶ 35.
108. See, e.g., Gibson v. Theut, 438 P.3d 666 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2019) (denying immunity to an
attorney who had been appointed as a guardian ad litem but whose real task was to represent a
minor as an advocate); Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40 (N.M. 1991) (stating guardian does not deserve
immunity and may be held liable under ordinary principles of malpractice if appointment does not
contemplate actions on behalf of the court, but rather, representation of the minor as an advocate,
or if the guardian departs from the scope of appointment as a functionary of the court); Hunnicutt
v. Sewell, 219 P.3d 529, 533 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (citing the New Mexico code requiring that the
court assure that the child’s attorney “zealously” represent the child).
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a minor plaintiff and a defendant in order to determine whether the
settlement is reasonable and in the best interests of the minor.109 Even
though in such cases the guardian ad litem reports his or her conclusion
to the court and the court makes the final decision to approve the
settlement, at least one court has held that when performing that duty the
guardian ad litem is not an agent of the court.110 Instead, the guardian acts
independently of the court and should be provided no immunity.
Although the court recognized that this decision could discourage people
from participating in the guardian ad litem program, it reasoned that this
concern was outweighed by a minor’s right to sue for inadequate
representation of her interests.111
Given that the confusion as to Fahrenkamp’s role as a guardian in
Nichols was never fully resolved, the decision of the court seems
incomplete. As stated above, the abstract conclusion it reaches is correct:
A guardian ad litem who serves as an arm of the court deserves immunity
from possible liability for negligence. But it is not clear that in this case
the guardian ad litem was, in fact, acting as an arm of the court.
The way in which the court ends the opinion suggests why this
apparent contradiction is important. As the court states, one of the most
important lessons of the case is that it is imperative for lower courts to
make abundantly clear what each person’s role is when appointing
guardians. As the court explains:
Courts, attorneys, and other professionals should strive to avert
misunderstandings before any issues develop. When a circuit court
appoints someone to a position like guardian ad litem, it should specify
that appointee’s role in the order of appointment. Finally, we urge the
General Assembly to consider reviewing the Probate Act and Marriage
Act to ensure that those statutes use the phrase “guardian ad litem”
consistently. . . . Reconciling all these provisions would help prevent
further confusion.112

Yet, despite the inadequate facts and the inconsistency in the statutes,
instead of deciding that the case needed to be remanded to clarify the role
of the guardian113 and the statutory analysis upon which the appointment
had been based, the court made certain assumptions to support a
conclusion that, although correct in the abstract, may or may not have
been the most accurate to apply given the facts of the case.
109. Jennifer L. Anton, The Ambiguous Role and Responsibilities of a Guardian Ad Litem in
Texas in Personal Injury Litigation, 51 SMU L. REV. 161, 174 (1997).
110. See Byrd v. Woodruff, 891 S.W.2d 689, 707–08 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
111. Id. at 708.
112. Nichols, 2019 IL 123990, ¶ 49.
113. See, e.g., Collins, 806 P.2d at 53–54 (remanding the case for the jury to decide whether
attorney simply “rubber-stamped” requests to obtain court approval, whether lawyer was supposed
to investigate reasonableness of a settlement, and the manner of compensation).
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As a result, it is still not clear whether a guardian ad litem for a minor
appointed under the Probate Act should be granted immunity from
possible liability for negligence. This is important because it creates the
risk that lower courts might grant immunity to lawyers appointed as
guardians ad litem merely because the term “guardian ad litem” was used
when making the appointment, leaving injured minors without recourse
to seek recovery for their injuries.114
It is also not clear whether a lawyer assigned to protect a child from
the possible misconduct of an appointed guardian of the estate of the child
should be considered to be a traditional guardian ad litem or something
different. It has been argued that courts should grant immunity to
guardians ad litem because there are other ways available to protect the
wards from possible misconduct. These include the facts that (1)
immunity attaches only to conduct within the scope of a guardian ad
litem’s duties, (2) the appointing court oversees the guardian ad litem’s
discharge of those duties, with the power of removal, (3) the parents can
move the court for termination of the guardian, (4) the court is not bound
by and need not accept the recommendations of the guardian, and (5) the
determinations adopted by an appointing court are subject to judicial
review.115
Yet, as the facts in Nichols show, these alternatives hardly offer any
help. First, the fact that immunity attaches only to conduct within the
scope of a guardian ad litem’s duties does not help since the issue remains
whether the guardian’s duty is akin to those of a judicial officer. Second,
although it is true that the court retains the ultimate authority to make
decisions, the reason a court assigns a guardian to oversee the conduct of
a personal guardian is precisely because the court needs someone else to
do it—maybe because it does not have the time or the expertise to do so—
and as a practical matter will likely rely entirely on the decisions of the
appointed guardian. Third, the fact that the parents can complain is
irrelevant in a case like Nichols in which the court appointed the guardian
to protect against the possible conduct of a parent. Lastly, having the right
to seek judicial review of the decisions of the court is not a practical
alternative when the person whose interest in seeking that review is a
minor without legal representation still under the care of the person
whose conduct the guardian should have been overseeing.
In Nichols, as a practical matter, the reason the court appointed
Fahrenkamp to do anything was to create another layer of protection for
114. For an argument in favor of not granting immunity to guardians ad litem, see Laurent,
supra note 65, at 658 (arguing that absolute immunity has historic justifications, but it also
represents one of the major failures of the modern child welfare system because it leaves injured
children and their parents without recourse for a guardian’s negligence actions).
115. Short v. Short, 730 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (D. Colo. 1990).
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the child by having someone make sure that the guardian for the estate
was acting appropriately. Viewed this way, it makes sense to argue that
the lawyer owed a duty to the child to perform this task with due care.
For this reason, in a case like that, if there is an allegation that the lawyer
did not do so, the minor should be allowed to have his or her day in court
to attempt to support a claim for the injuries caused by the negligence of
the lawyer. Otherwise, the analysis of the court has the perverse result
that in cases in which a lower court appoints someone for the purpose of
providing more protection for the minor, the minor ends up with no
protection at all.
The policy behind awarding immunity to guardians ad litem is that the
threat of litigation could negatively interfere with the ability of guardians
ad litem to function on behalf of the court to provide the court with
reliable independently gathered information.116 In contrast, extending
judicial immunity to a lawyer who is appointed to represent and protect
the interests of the child would actually operate to prejudice the minor as
it would serve, in effect, to excuse negligent representation of the minor’s
interests before the court.
CONCLUSION
Illinois law recognizes many ways in which courts can appoint
attorneys to help protect minors whose interests might be affected by
different types of court proceedings. Courts can appoint attorneys to serve
as attorneys, guardians of the person, guardians of the estate, child
representatives and guardians ad litem in many different circumstances
and under several different statutes. The statutes however are not
consistent on what the duties of a guardian ad litem should be and,
therefore, by implication, on whether their duties are owed to the minor
or to the court.
Under the Marriage Act, an attorney appointed to represent a minor as
a lawyer for the minor clearly owes the minor a duty of due care and
would be subject to liability if negligent. Although there is some case law
in lower courts that suggests the contrary,117 the same should be true of
116. Mahaffey, supra note 1, at 284 (stating that immunity is granted because it is viewed as
necessary to prevent the “chilling” effect of potential civil liability might have on the exercise of
judgment on the part of the guardian ad litem).
117. See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 2009) (finding that guardians ad litem
and court-appointed experts are immune from liability for damages when they act at the court’s
direction); Davidson v. Gurewitz, 48 N.E.3d 1129, 1132–33 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015), aff’d, 48 N.E.3d
672 (Ill. 2016) (“Section 506(a) does not confer any immunity from civil liability for the work
performed thereby.”); Vlastelica v. Brend, 954 N.E.2d 874, 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011), aff’d, 962
N.E.2d 490 (Ill. 2011) (“Although a child representative is not intended to abrogate the decision
making power of the trier of fact or act in the role of a surrogate . . . his investigative and advocacy
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lawyers appointed as child representatives because, in essence, they act
as attorneys with a different level of authority to make decisions for their
clients. An attorney appointed as a guardian ad litem, on the other hand,
is expected to perform duties on behalf of the court and, therefore, should
be granted immunity from possible liability.
Under the language of the Probate Act, on the other hand, a guardian
ad litem is appointed to represent the minor in a way that suggests the
Probate Act considers the guardian ad litem for a minor more like an
advocate. This would mean that the guardian ad litem for a minor under
the Probate Act owes a duty to the minor and may be subject to liability
for negligence.
Lastly, courts in Illinois recognize that judges have inherent authority
to appoint guardians ad litem without reference to any of these statutes in
cases where the interests of minors might need to be protected. In such a
case, whether the appointed guardian owes a duty to the minor or to the
court and, therefore, whether the guardian could be subject to possible
liability for negligence, should depend on an analysis of the actual duties
assigned to the guardian by the court. The threat of civil liability in those
instances where a guardian does not have immunity is no different than
that faced by any attorney appearing in any other type of lawsuit and is
consistent with the fiduciary obligation imposed upon any guardian in
representing a ward under the Probate Act.
Unfortunately, in the most recent case to study these issues, the Illinois
Supreme Court made them more difficult to understand because the facts
of the case did not quite support the conclusion reached by the court. The
court did, however, make some important suggestions that can help
clarify this area of the law in the future. Thus, as the court suggests, the
General Assembly should consider reviewing the Probate Act and
Marriage Act to ensure that the phrase “guardian ad litem” is used
consistently throughout the statutes. More importantly, however, courts,
attorneys, and other professionals should strive to avert
misunderstandings before any issues develop by specifying the statutory
basis for an appointment of a guardian and the specific tasks assigned to
anyone appointed to serve as a guardian ad litem. Only that way will the
interests of both minors and guardians be better protected. Only that way
the interests of both minors and guardians will be better protected.

roles aid the court making a neutral determination of the child’s best interests. In so aiding the court
in making a neutral determination of the child’s best interests, the child representative is acting as
an arm of the court even while performing his role as an advocate. Accordingly, we hold that the
child representative is entitled to absolute immunity for his work as an advocate occurring within
the course of his court-appointed duties.”).

